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When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
soru l to.e,, it ,u.ans just what i choose it to
mean-neither more nor less."
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than 14 million people in the previous two decades have
fled coercive governments which afford little protection for fundamental human rights.2 The emmigration of these political refugees
represents a long-standing, international tragedy.
In 1951, the international community created a framework for
mitigating this suffering: the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Convention). 3 In an effort to
1. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEwis CARROLL 196 (1939).

2. Leonard B. Sutton, PoliticalAsylum and Other Concerns: Some Reflections on the
World, Yesterday, and Today, 19 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475, 475-76 (1991); Dr. Keith W.
Yundt, InternationalLaw and the Latin American Political Refugee Crisis, 19 INTER-Am.
L. REv. 137, 139-40 (1987); Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 559-71 (1985); Animesh Ghoshal &
Thomas M. Crowley, Refugees and Immigrants: a Human Rights Dilemma, 5 HuM. RTs. Q.
327, 343-46 (1983); Amelia C. Fawcett, U.S. Immigration and Refugee Reform: a Critical
Evaluation, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 805, 806 (1982). But see Robert Weiner, The Agony and the
Exodus: Deporting Salvadorans in Violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 18 Isrr'L L.
& POL'Y 703, 703-04.
3. Convention Relating to The Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter The 1951 Convention].
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conform United States immigration law with existing international
norms, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, governing an
alien's eligibility for political asylum.'
The Act defines an alien as a refugee eligible for asylum provided that she can demonstrate that she has, at the very least, "'a
well-founded fear of persecution' in [her] home country on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."5
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the
meaning of "persecution on account of ...

political opinion," sec-

tion 208(a) of the 1980 Refugee Act: a question which it left unana
swered in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias in 1987, after he fled Guatemala and illegally entered the United States.7 Elias-Zacarias unsuccessfully sought both withholding of deportation and political
asylums on the grounds that his resistance to the Guatemalan
guerrillas' recruiting efforts demonstrated a reasonable and credible fear of persecution if he were to return.9 The Court in INS v.
Elias-Zacarias,921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812,
814 (1992) held that, in discretionary asylum proceedings under
section 208(a) of the 1980 Refugee Act, a "generalized political mo'
tive underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment" of an alien
seeking asylum was insufficiently "political" to warrant a fear of
persecution on account of political opinion."
This Case Comment examines the Supreme Court's treatment
4. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(amending Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)) [hereinafter Refugee Act of 1980] (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988)). The Act provides that:
the Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
alien is a refugee within the meaning of §§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
Id.
5. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a) (1988).
6. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
7. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812, 814 (1992).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 814-15.
10. Id. at 816.
11. Id.
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of the controlling immigration statutes and international treaty obligations. It discusses the Elias-Zacariasdecision's effectiveness, as
an answer to the unresolved issues of the 1987 Cardoza-Fonseca
decision concerning the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard. It gives special emphasis to Justice Steven's dissent, which
points to inconsistencies in the standard articulated by the majority, and suggests that the Elias-Zacariasdecision effectively represents a withdrawal from Cardoza-Fonseca'smore "liberal" asylum
standard.
This Case Comment will argue that, in the context of current
Central American political unrest, the Supreme Court's standard is
unnecessarily strict, confuses the underlying reasons for immigration with those for asylum, and fails to implement the principal
goals of the 1980 Refugee Act, effectively frustrating legislative intent and engaging in the very judicial law-making which it purports to avoid.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL ASYLUM

Refugee Law Prior to 1968

Traditionally, the United States has, in various forms, offered
refuge to aliens fleeing persecution. 12 Our nation, after all, is a
composite of immigrants. Nevertheless, a dual tension has characterized the United States immigration policy: society's almost sacrosanct respect for fundamental human rights versus the national
interest in protecting its own citizen's rights. The expansion and
contraction of statutory restrictions on immigrant composition and
quantity has reflected this tension."i
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948'" represented the first
post-war, statutory authorization to provide relief specifically to
refugees."' Four years later, Congress passed the Immigration and
12. Note, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a More Liberal Asylum Standard,
37 Am. U. L. REV. 915, 915 (1988); Jacqueline Reardon, Case Comment, Applying an Objective Standard to Determining a "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution," M.A. A26851062 v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g en bane
granted, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989), 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 855, 857 (1990). See
Amelia A. Fawcett, U.S. Immigration and Refugee Reform: A Critical Evaluation,22 VA. J.
INT'L L. 805, 807-809 (1982).
13. See generally Reardon, supra note 12, at 857-58.
14. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (repealed 1952)
(the Act provided both privileges and restrictions).
15. Richard R. Silver, Note, Will I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca Affect the Ninth Circuit
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Nationality Act" which, in section 243(h), granted the United
States Attorney General the discretion to withhold deportation,
provided an alien could demonstrate a "clear probability" or "likelihood" of "physical persecution" were she returned to her home
country.1 7 Such relief was generally available to aliens who were
unlawfully in the United States and subject to deportation. 8 Section 212(d)(5) of the Act gave the Attorney General the discretion
to parole, as a temporary measure, any alien in the United States
because of desperate circumstances for reasons which were
"strictly in the public interest."1 While both provisions entrusted
the Attorney General with substantial discretion, the parole standard drew criticism as too susceptible to United States foreign policy and an unacceptable bedrock for long-term United States refugee policy.20
In 1965, Congress amended section 243(h) of the Act." A more
expansive stipulation to protect those persecuted because of "race,
religion, or political opinion" replaced the requirement of "physical
persecution."" The amendments also created a provision, section
203(a)(7), for conditional refugee admission from a wider geographic area than previously allowed,23 including limited numbers of
aliens fleeing Communist countries.
B.

Refugee Law Between 1968 and 1980

.In 1968, the United States acceded to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol)." The ProCourt of Appeal's Review of Asylum and Withholding of DeportationCases?, 10 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & Comp. L.J. 197, 217 (1988).
16. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988)).
17. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988)).
18. Id. Exceptions included those aliens who had either participated in the persecution
of another or who were convicted of a serious crime and represented a danger to the community. Id.
19. See id. at § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (1988)).
20. STAF' OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., IST SESs., REVIEW OF U.S.
REFUGEE REsETrLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLIcIEs 28 (Comm. Print 1979).
21. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 11, 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965).
22. Id.
23. Id; Silver, supra note 15, at 202.
24. Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter The Protocol]. The Protocol incorporates articles 2 through 34 of
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tocol, a multilateral treaty, has been the principal international
guide for protecting refugees worldwide.2 5 The Protocol binds parties to "comply with the substantive provisions of articles 2
through 34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ...."2
C.

The Refugee Concept Under the Protocol

One of the Protocol's key elements is its clarification of the
term, "refugee." Article 1(2) states that a "refugee" is one who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted, for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country.27
In addition, article 33 of the Protocol provides for entitlement to
relief, if the alien can prove a threat to her "life or freedom" bethe 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189

U.N.T.S. 150.
25. See MAGNA CARTA FOR REFUGEES (1951); Carol Wilson, Note, Well-founded Fear of
Persecution-The Standard of Proof in Political Asylum Resolved, or Is It?: I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 22 U.S.F. L REv. 385 (1988).
26. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984). Although the United States is not a party to
the 1951 Convention, United States accession to the Protocol mandates compliance with the
Convention provisions. See Barry Sautman, The Meaning of "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" in United States Asylum Law and in InternationalLaw, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 483,
491-92 n.27 (1986); Elwin Griffith, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation-Challengesto
the Alien After the Refugee Act of 1980, 12 Loy. LA. INrr'L & CoMP. L.J. 516, 517 (1990).
Nevertheless, by binding parties to undertake the application of articles 2 through 34 of the
Convention, the Protocol incorporates the Convention into United States law through reference. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144. Both
the Senate and the President approved the Protocol in 1968. The Protocol, supra note 24.
But the Protocol is executed only to the extent that Congress passes specific implementing
legislation, thus, the 1980 Refugee Act. Erik J. Davenport, Note, Cardoza-Fonseca: Supreme Court Takes Initiative to End Current Inequities in Law of Asylum, 18 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 179, 183 (1987). But see Raymond W. Valori, Note, Substantive Rights Accorded
Refugees Interdicted on the High Seas: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 24 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 367, 386-90 (1993) (certain articles of the Convention, as incorporated by
the Protocol, are self-executing and, thus, require no implementing legislation).
Article VI, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that:
[a]1l treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
27. The Protocol, supra note 24, art. 1, sec. 2 at 6261.

19931

ELIAS-ZACARIAS AND POLITICAL ASYLUM

473

cause of her "refugee" attributes.2
Although Congress initially believed that the Immigration and
Nationality Act would not need amendment to comply with the
Protocol, it later found that section 203(a)(7) was ill-suited to realize these Protocol guidelines. 29 Most critically, section 203(a)(7)
failed to provide any alien already within the United States borders with an asylum application procedure. Withholding of deportation and asylum applications were procedurally
indistinguishable.8
D. The 1980 Refugee Act
The 1980 Refugee Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 by, at last, incorporating a definition of refugee
which acknowledged the "plight of homeless people all over the
world."" l The legislative history of the Refugee Act indicates that
harmonization with United States international treaty obligations
under the United Nations Convention and Protocol was a vital objective. 2 Congress adopted these standards to promote neutral,
non-ideological decision-making by the INS by increasing an
alien's procedural, rather than substantive, rights.3 Several courts
have looked to the Office of the United Nations High Commis28. The Protocol, supra note 24, art. 33 at 6276; Shane M. Sorenson, Note, Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Two Steps In The Right Direction, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 95, 102 (1989).
29. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1979) (in a letter to Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance and others, Senator Edward Kennedy described the need "to establish a
long range refugee policy" that treated all fairly and assisted all equally); see also S. REP.
No. 256, supra note 26, at 144-45; STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 28

(Comm. Print 1979).
30. The INS revoked the 1974 regulation which allowed aliens to apply for asylum, 8
C.F.R. § 108 (1975), upon enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act which provided greater procedural safeguards. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1988).
31. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 4; S. REP. No. 256, supra note 26, at 142.
32. See Admission of Refugees into the United States, Part II: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 15 (1978); S. REP. No. 256, supra note 26, at 144; S.
REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 19, 20 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19,
20 (1980) (adopting the definition of refugee contained in Article 1(2) of the Protocol and
replacing the previously restrictive eligibility requirements of § 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
33. Heather A. Joys, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The
Illusion of a Liberal Standard in Asylum Adjudication, 7 WIS. INr'L L.J. 231, 238 (1988)
(arguing that the increased procedural rights have done little to favorably impact refugee
status).
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sioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
for guidance in interpreting these
8
new asylum standards. '

Neither the Act nor any single case has distinguished the degree of persecution required for relief under the asylum provision
from that required under the withholding of deportation provisions. 3 5 Further, the Act has generated considerable litigation because of its implicit rejection of more general, humanitarian bases
for relief for aliens fleeing war-torn or economically ruined nations.30 Nevertheless, by conferring greater procedural safeguards
for fair and humane treatment of refugees escaping persecution,
the Refugee Act brought important changes in United States im37
migration law.
1. Asylum Under Section 208(a)
Most notably, the Act establishes the first separate provision
for asylum.38 Section 208(a) gives the Attorney General discretion
to grant asylum to any alien who fits within the 1951 Convention's
definition of "refugee. '"
34. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMsliONEm FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, 1180-83, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4,
U.N. Sales No. E.79.II.1 (1979) [hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK]. The U.N. Handbook does not
have the force of law. However, both the Bureau of Immigration Affairs and the United
States courts have referred to the U.N. Handbook in interpreting the Protocol. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
35. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439-40; Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509,
516 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v.'INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 n.13 (9th Cir. 1984);
Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Comment, The Need for a
Codified Definition of "Persecution" in the United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV.
187 (1986).
36. Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refugee
Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 3
(1989).
37. The Protocol, supra note 24, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
38. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 4, at § 208(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1988)); Silver, supra note 15.
39. Refugee Act of 1980, at § 208(a). Section 1253(h)(1) denies an applicant withholding of deportation and section 1158(a) denies an applicant asylum under the Act if the alien
has: (1) been "firmly resettled" in a third country, (2) participated in persecution of others,
(3) been convicted of a "serious crime" and constitutes a "danger" to the community or the
United States, (4) been considered to have committed a "serious political crime" prior to
entering the United States, or (5) been deemed a "danger" to United States security. Id. at
§ 208.8(f)(iii) - (vi) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(iii) - (iv)). The practical significance of
section 208(a) is that once the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concludes that an applicant meets the provision's requirements, that applicant can seek the approval of the United
States Attorney General to remain in this country. The decision to allow the applicant to
remain under section 208(a) is ultimately that of the Attorney General. Id.
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The controversial "well-founded fear of persecution" standard
first appeared in this Act.4 0 This standard has both objective and
subjective components. The objective component requires direct
evidence of a credible, specific threat which demonstrates the reasonableness of an applicant's fear.41 The subjective component requires the applicant to demonstrate that he genuinely holds this
fear.42
2. Withholding of Deportation Under Section 243(h)
This Act makes the previously discretionary withholding of
deportation mandatory, provided an alien meets the statutory requirements.4" The applicant must show that her "life or freedom
would be threatened" were she deported to her home country." In
INS v. Stevic, the United States Supreme Court construed section
243(h) to require that an alien "establish a clear probability of perthe Refugee Act did not change the
secution" and emphasized that
45
"clear probability" standard.

40. The 1980 Refugee Act states that a refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality... and is unable or unwilling to return to... that country
because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social group, or political opinion." The Refugee Act of
1980, supra note 4; see also 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
41. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986).
42. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 at n.11 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING

REFUGEE STATUS. $ 80-83, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4, U.N. Sales No. E.79.II.1 (Sept. 1979))).
43. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 4, § 1253(h)(1). As amended, § 12533(h)
provides:
the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
44. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 4, § 1253(h)(1). This standard is grounded in
the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, art. 33.1:
no Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The Convention, supra note 3, art 33.1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
However, the United States, while withholding deportation to the alien's home country, may
deport the alien to another country. See, e.g., In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (BIA
1982) (withholding deportation to Afghanistan but deporting alien to Pakistan); In re Portales, 18 1. & N. Dec. 239, 242 (BIA 1982). The burden of proof is on the alien to show that
"it is more likely than not" that the alien would be persecuted if deported to his home
country. INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
45. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 413.
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WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION: CONFLICT AMONG THE
CIRCUITS RESOLVED?

A.

The Conflict

While INS v. Stevic may have determined the criterion for
withholding of deportation, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) and the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and
Sixth Circuits continued to treat the evidentiary standards for asylum and deportation as equivalent,"6 notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's dicta in Stevic suggesting that the standard for deportation
was more rigorous.47 , The Eleventh,48 Ninth,4 9 Seventh,50 Fifth,5 1
and Second5 2 Circuits took the position that the standards for
withholding of deportation and for asylum were distinguishable.
B.

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca

In 1987, the Supreme Court addressed the ambiguity between
the "well-founded fear of persecution" and "clear probability"
standards in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.63 In denying her applications, the immigration judge and the BIA applied the same "clear
probability of persecution" standard to both Luz Marina CardozaFonseca's applications for asylum and for withholding of deportation to Nicaragua.5 4 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Cardoza argued that the lower court erred in applying a "more likely than
not" rather than a "well-founded fear of persecution" standard to
46. See Matter of Acosta, BIA Int. Dec. 2986 (Mar. 1, 1985); Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d
532, 533 (3d Cir. 1985) (the court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it
construed the requirements for establishing a "clear probability" to be the equivalent of
those for "well-founded fear of persecution"); Reyes v. INS, 673 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1982);
Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Sautman, supra note 26"at 491-523;
Tracy Anne Kane, Case Comment, Aliens-Standard for Asylum-Well-Founded Fear of
PersecutionAffirmed as the AppropriateBurden of Proof Required of Aliens Applying for
Asylum, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207
(1987), 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 431, 438 (1988); Elaine Moye Whitford, Note, Immigra-

tion and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Last Word on the Standard of
Proof for Asylum Proceedings? 13 N.C. J. INT'L & CoM. REG. 171, 177-79 (1988).
47. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424-25.
48. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985).
49. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565
(1987).
52. Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
53. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
54. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir 1985).
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her section 208(a) asylum application." Reversing the BIA decision, the Ninth Circuit endorsed a "well-founded fear" standard
previously articulated in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS " to distinguish the "possibility" of persecution from that of "probability." 57
1. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court resolved the jurisdictions'
doctrinal conflict by holding that the standard in asylum cases was
that of a "well-founded fear of persecution" rather than the "clear
probability" test.58 The Court noted that an asylum applicant
could "have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there
is a less than 50% chance of the occurrence taking place."59 Hence,
the Cardoza-Fonseca decision separated the standard applied to
asylum applications from that for withholding of deportation. "
However, the focus of the Court's inquiry was largely upon the
Protocol, the 1980 Refugee Act, and the legislature's intent. Referring to the relevant language of the 1980 Refugee Act," Justice
55. Id. at 1450.
56. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984).
57. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d at 1450-53. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit construed the statutory language of section 208(a) to mean that the burden of proof
for asylum was not limited to direct threats to life or freedom. Rather, the court reasoned
that such burden rested upon whether there had been a showing of a subjective fear. The
court stated that under the well-founded fear standard, an applicant had to establish "specific facts through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or 'good reason' to
fear future persecution." Id. at 1453 (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 526, 574 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
58. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
59. Id. at 431. To elucidate this point, the Court cited a hypothetical offered by a refugee law authority:
[liet us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of origin
every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote
labor camp....
In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who
has managed to escape from the country in question will have 'well-founded fear
of being persecuted' upon his eventual return.
Id. (quoting 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180

(1966)).
60. Id at 436-37. See generally Linsley J. Barbato, A Lighter Burden For Refugees:
The Well-Founded Fear Standard Of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. CardozaFonseca, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209, 229-31 (1988); Kane, supra note 46, at 431.
61. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1988)). Justice Stevens also reasoned
that Congress' rejection of a Senate bill which would have limited asylum eligibility to only
those aliens also eligible for withholding of deportation signalled congressional intent to
maintain different standards for the two separate forms of relief. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 441.
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Stevens stated that" 'fear' in the section 208(a) standard obviously
makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the
subjective mental state of the alien."" The Court found support
for this "plain" reading by examining the Act's legislative history."
While the Court expressly declined to specify how the "wellfounded fear or persecution" standard should be applied, 4 it concluded, after examining various international law sources, that
there was "simply no room in the United Nations' definition for
concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of
being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no
'well-founded fear' of the event happening."6 5 Citing INS v.
62. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
63. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-33 (1987) (relying on Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)); Id. at 447-48
(Justice Stevens concluded that the judiciary, rather than the INS agency, was the final
authority to interpret statutes).
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion disagreed with the Court's "exhaustive investigation" of the Act's iegislative history of the Act, arguing that where "the language of a
statute is clear, that language must be given effect," short of a "patent absurdity." Id. at
452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
When a court should independently give content to statutory interpretation and when
the court should defer to an agency's construction of that governing statute has been a longstanding debate. Under one line of cases, the court will defer to the agency interpretation,
applying a "reasonableness" standard, provided that interpretation has a "reasonable basis
in law." See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980). The opposing line of cases ignores
deference and actively interprets statutes to ensure their correct application. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Russell v. United States, 464
U.S. 16 (1983); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956). For further discussion, see generally Sorenson, supra note 28; Gilbert Hahn, III, Note, Perfectingthe Partnership: Structuring the Judicial Control of Administrative Determinations of Questions of
Law, 31 VAND. L. REV. 91 (1978). Some jurists argue that the determination of the proper
scope of judicial review, in practice, rests upon the result desired. See AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 712 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. The Court stated, "[wie do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how
the well-founded fear test should be applied." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448.
65. Id. at 440. The Court relied on the Protocol and the U.N. Handbook in concluding
that Congress intended to create a different standard:
[i]n interpreting the Protocol's definition of "refugee" we are further guided by
the analysis set forth in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(Geneva, September, 1979). The Handbook explains that "[iun general, the applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons
be intolerable if he returned there."
Id. at 438-39 (quoting U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 12-13, 942).
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Stevic, 6 the Court explained that "a moderate interpretation of
the 'well-founded fear' standard would indicate that 'so long as an
objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be
shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it
is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.' "" Congress
did not intend, through amending the INA, to diminish the refugee
eligibility standards.6 8 Rather, it sought to remedy the previous
law's political and geographical limitations.ea
2., The Dissent
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White, argued that the BIA's interpretation of sections 208 and
243 was "reasonable." 7 0 Justice Powell stated that "[b]ecause both
standards necessarily contemplate some objective basis, I cannot
agree with the Court's implicit conclusion that the statute resolves
this question on its face."'7' Moreover, because the BIA had been
delegated the "responsibility for making these determinations"
and had examined more immigration cases than the Court will ever
review, the BIA was best qualified to evaluate whether the applicant met the evidentiary burden. 72 Last, the dissent strongly disapproved of the Court's reference to international law documents as
persuasive authority.7'
3. The Concurring Opinions
a. Justice Blackmun
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stressed the ma66. 467 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984).
67. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
68. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); Joys, supra note 33, at 238.
69. Id. at 436-37 (citing S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 157 and H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 9 (1979)). See generally Joys, supra note 33, at 238; Note, Immigration Law: Political Asylum, 101 HAav. L.
REv.340, 342 (1987).
70. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 460-61 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 464 (1987). Justice Powell argued that reference to materials interpreting the Protocol were only "marginally relevant" because statements made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "have no binding
force." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Refugee status eligibility was solely up to the contracting
state's to determine. Id. (citing the U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34).
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jority's explanation that "an examination of the subjective feelings
of an applicant coupled with an inquiry into the objective nature
of the articulated reasons for fear"' was the appropriate test for
deriving the meaning of the "well-founded fear" standard. Further,
Justice Blackmun strongly suggested that, in formulating this standard in the context of the 1980 Refugee Act, the INS refer to the
Protocol as a valuable interpretive device."
b.

Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's narrow holding that the
standards applied to asylum applications and to withholding of deportation applications were distinct.7e* However, Justice Scalia
concurred rather than join the majority in its judgment because he
disapproved of the Court's exhaustive investigation of the legislative history of an enactment which was clear on its face.77 Second,
Justice Scalia strongly disagreed with the Court's discourse on
whether INS's assessment of "well-founded fear" merited deference.7; He argued that, in light of the Court's settled interpretation
of Chevron,7 9 the Court need not even explore the issue of deference to the INS's interpretation because that interpretation clearly
differed from Congress' expressed intent in the 1980 Refugee Act.' 0
4. The Significance of the Court's Reliance on International
Norms
The Court's reference to both the Protocol and the Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status' is
74. Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 450-51.
76. Id. at 452.
77. Id. at 452-53.
78. Id. at 453 (referring to 446 n.30).
79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
80. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.'v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. at 842-43). Justice Scalia stated that Chevron
"has been an extremely important and frequently cited opinion" which stands for the proposition that "courts must give effect to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute
unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent." Id.
at 454. The Court's interpretation of Chevron was "an evisceration" of its well-established
meaning. Id.
81. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34, § v. Published only shortly before the enactment of
the 1980 Refugee Act, the U.N. Handbook is a useful guide in determining the Protocol's
meaning which, in turn, gives content to the Refugee Act of 1980. See Mary Jo Paulette-
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perhaps Cardoza-Fonseca'smost important signal to lower courts.
In its effort to give content to the United States asylum standard,
the Court evaluated numerous international documents to which
the United States is not even a signatory; 5 thus, evincing judicial
recognition of international standards as persuasive authority."5
Although the Court stated that it was not suggesting "that the
explanation in the [U.N. Handbook] has the force of law or in any
way binds the INS with reference to the asylum provisions of
§ 208(a)," it did describe the U.N. Handbook as a significant guide
"in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform." ' The Court confirmed that Congress' unmistakable purpose in enacting the 1980 Refugee Act was to harmonize U.S. refugee law with the Protocol.85 A fortiori, the Court seemed to suggest
that the BIA must apply an asylum standard which followed the
Protocol. Nevertheless, its words were cautious.
The Court emphasized that it was deciding only the narrow
question of whether the asylum and withholding of deportation
standards were distinct; not "the question of interpretation that
arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply either
or both standards to a particular set of facts." 8 It also stated that
the Act entrusted the BIA with any "gap-filling" of the admittedly-ambiguous "well-founded fear" standard."' Lower courts
Toumert, Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Liberalizing
United States Asylum Law, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 295, 314 (1988).
82. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-40 (citing Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, sec. C, annex 1, Pt. 1, § Cl(a)(i)). See 62 Stat. 3037; The 1951
Convention, supra note 3; UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE
AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON STATELESSNESS AND RELATED PROBLEMS 37 U.N. Doc. E/1618, E/
AC.32/5 (1950); INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, MANUAL FOR ELIGIBILITY OFFICERS.
No. 175, ch. IV, annex 1, pt. 1, § C19, at 24 (1950).
83. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439, n.22.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 436. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979). The House stated:
[t]he Senate bill provided for withholding of deportation of aliens to countries
where they would face persecution, unless their deportation would be permitted
under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
The House amendment provided a similar withholding procedure:
[we] adopt the House provision with the understanding that it is based directly
upon language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed
consistent with the Protocol.
Id.
86. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). The Court stated that it
would leave the development of the standard to the "process of case-by-case adjudication."
Id.
87. Id.
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were instructed to "respect the interpretation of that agency to
which Congress [had] delegated the responsibility for administering" the immigration program."8
Yet, it also directed the lower courts to follow the "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation
statutes in favor of the alien.""' If, as the Court concluded, Congress intended that U.S. refugee law conform with the Protocol,
the agency responsible for developing the "well-founded

fear"

standard would be violating clear congressional intent should its
articulated standard not comport with the Protocol.' 0 'That the
Court did not specifically state this could reflect a decision not to
belabor the obvious. It could also reflect an inference to which the
Court did not wish to leap. The Cardoza-Fonsecadecision necessarily left unresolved future issues surrounding the "well-founded
fear" standard's meaning, its need for uniform application, and the
extent to which the courts must ensure BIA compliance with the
Protocol."'
C.

The Asylum Standard Since Cardoza-Fonseca

The BIA's first published decision following Cardoza-Fonseca,
Matter of Mogharrabi,s2 applied a reasonable person test to the
"well-founded fear" of persecution standard.9' Like the Ninth Cir88. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. at
843, (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))).
89. Id. at 449 (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S.
120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
90. In contrast to Justice Scalia's proposed broad reading of Chevron, Justice Stevens
adhered to a narrow reading that statutory ambiguity, standing alone, did not automatically
create a presumption of a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority. Id. at 445; Sorenson, supra note 28, at 125. The majority's reluctance to so willingly infer a delegation of
lawmaking authority from the congressional to the executive branch has strong Constitutional underpinnings. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
91. "If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. at 445, n.29 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. at 837). But see, Silver, supra note 15, at 228; Note, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Last Word on the Standard of Proof for
Asylum Proceedings?, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171, 182 (1988) (failure to define the
"well-founded fear" standard will perpetuate ambiguity and inconsistency in its
application).
92. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. No. 3028 (BIA, June 12, 1987).
93. Id. at 442, 447.
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cuit in Cardoza-Fonseca,4 the BIA applied the distinction between "possibility" and "probability" of persecution 5 previously
articulated in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS." The BIA relied on the
objective and subjective components of the "well-founded fear"
standard previously articulated in Diaz-Escobar and Stevic. e7 Cit-

ing Matter of Acosta,"8 the BIA applied a four prong test to determine whether an alien's fear was objectively reasonable: (i) the
alien's possession of either a belief or trait which the persecutor
seeks to punish, which the persecutor is (ii) easily able to discover,
(iii) capable of punishing, and (iv) inclined to punish.9 Hence, the
conditions of the nation which the applicant fled were highly relevant. 10 0 Moreover, the BIA held that, where an alien's testimony
was the only accessible evidence of persecution, it was sufficient so
long as it agreed with the applicant's general account.' 1 Notably,
the BIA referred to the U.N. Handbook in arriving at this
decision.102
However, shortly after Cardoza-Fonseca,the Ninth Circuit in
Corado Rodriguez v. INS10 reversed the BIA's denial of an applicants' motion to remand for a hearing on their asylum and withholding of deportation claims, expressing great skepticism of the
BIA "catch-all" standards.104 The Ninth Circuit required the BIA,
94. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450-53 (9th Cir. 1985).
95. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028 at 447.
96. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS 767 F. 2d 1277, 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984).
97. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028, 442-44 (BIA, June 12, 1987) (citing DiazEscobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 424-25
(1984)) (holding that an alien must prove both the subjective and objective elements of a
fear of persecution are present).
98. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA, March 1, 1985).
99. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028 at 446 (citing Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986 at
226).
[A]lthough our decision in Matter of Acosta has been effectively overruled by
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, . . . insofar as Acosta held that the well-founded fear
standard and the clear probability standard may be equated, much of our decision remains intact and good law. Indeed, we still find in Acosta some guidance
regarding the meaning of a well-founded fear.
100. Id. at 446; Joys, supra note 33, at 248.
101. Id. at 446; Joys, supra note 33, at 248.
102. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028, 446 (BIA, June 12, 1987). The BIA, even
before the Cardoza-Fonsecadecision, looked to the U.N. Handbook for guidance in interpreting the Protocol and the Refugee Act of 1980. See e.g., In re Matter of Frentescu, 18 I &
N Dec. 244, 246 (BIA 1982); Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I & N Dec. 465 (BIA 1980).
103. Corado Rodriguez v. INS, 828 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 627. The Ninth Circuit was specifically addressing the government's argument that irrespective of whether the BIA evaluated the applicants' claim in terms of proving a "clear probability," a "realistic likelihood," or "valid reason to fear" persecution, the
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henceforth, to state explicitly that it was applying a more generous
asylum standard.10 5
The Fourth Circuit attempted to define that standard in M.A.
A26851062 v. INS'06 by focusing on "what proportion of objective
and subjective evidence [was] necessary to support a well-founded
fear, and specifically how much objective evidence must be adduced to render the subjective fear 'well founded.' ,1O7 The applicant based his claim that he feared persecution primarily upon the
fact that he evaded the draft in El Salvador.10 8 The Court referred
extensively to the U.N. Handbook to discern M.A.'s refugee status
as a draft evader.1 0' Having carefully weighed M.A.'s affidavit and
supporting evidence"' that the military with tacit government apthe Fourth Circuit concluded
proval brutalized its opponents,'
that M.A.'s failure to serve in the military might qualify him as a
BIA made the correct determination. "The BIA frequently inserts the catchall statement set
forth above in its asylum decisions." Id. at 627-28 (citing Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463,
1468 (9th Cir. 1986)); Rebollo-Jovel v. INS, 794 F.2d 441, 446 (9th Cir. 1986); CardozaFonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985)).
105. Corado Rodriguez v. INS, 828 F.2d at 627. "Normally we would accept an assertion that petitioners do not qualify for relief irrespective of the standard used as an indication that the Board assessed the claim under differing standards and found it wanting under
each." Id. However, where the Board "repeatedly" failed to distinguish between the asylum
and withholding of deportation standards, "it is likely that [the Board] is assessing the
claim only under the more demanding test." Id.
106. 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 866 F.2d 660 (4th. Cir. 1989), rev'd,
899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990).
107. Id. at 213.
108. Id. at 213.
109. Id. at 214. The U.N. Handbook "recognizes draft evaders as a distinct group for
purposes of determining refugee status." U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34. Draft evaders were
refugees if they were able to show that they would "suffer disproportionately severe punishment for the military offen[sle on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d at 215 (citing
U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 1 169).
There are, however, also cases where the necessity to perform military service
may be the sole ground for a claim to refugee status, i.e. when a person can show
that the performance of military service would have required his participation in
military action contrary to his genuine political, religious, or moral convictions,
or to valid reasons of conscience.
Id. at 215 (quoting U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 1 170-71).
110. "Such statements should be accepted as true 'where they establish factual circumstances with specificity, are not speculative, and do not conflict with petitioner's other evidence.'" M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d at 217 (citing Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d
562, 577 (7th Cir. 1984)). The court also relied upon supporting statements by Dr. Charles
Clements, who practiced medicine in El Salvador from March 1982 to February 1983, and
William M. Leo Grande, Director of Political Science at the School of Government and
Public Administration at American University in Washington, D.C. Id. at 217.
111. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1988).
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political refugee."1 2 M.A. had to establish that "his sincere refusal
to participate in the actions of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, and
the likelihood that he [would] be punished for his refusal to
1 13
serve."'

Thus, the Fourth Circuit relied extensively on the U.N. Handbook and the factual context of the applicant's home country. The
court demonstrated that, rather than having to prove M.A.'s specific threats, proof of objective facts of possible persecution was
sufficient for political asylum consideration." 4 This decision effectively extended the Cardoza-Fonsecaholding." 5
On January 5, 1989, the Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en
banc, accepting the Justice Department's argument that the issues
presented in M.A.'s case might substantially alter United States
asylum law."O The court reversed the previous panel's decision, affirmed the BIA judgment, and ordered M.A.'s deportation to El
17
Salvador.

This decision redefined a liberalized standard of a general
"fear of possible persecution," based on lengthy reference to the
U.N. Handbook and other international documents."' The "well112. Id.
113. Id. at 215-16; U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34,
170-71 (stating that draft evaders,
while recognized as a distinct group for purposes of refugee status, are not considered "persecuted" when penalized for such evasion). However, if the military actions conflict with
one's "political, moral religious, or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience," and
are "condemned by the international community" one may be a refugee. M.A. A26851062 v.
INS, 858 F.2d at 215-16 (citing U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34,
170-171).
114. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d at 215-16. M.A. included Americas Watch and
Amnesty International's documentary evidence which "presents an 'additional reason to
take the threat seriously.'" Id. (citing Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir.
1985) (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984)).
115. See Reardon, supra note 12; cf. Leon Wildes, The Dilemma of the Refugee: His
Standard for Relief, 4 Cardozo L. Rev. 353, 377 (1983) (INS is over-burdened).
116. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989). See John A. Detzner,
Aliens-Political Asylum-Eligibility of Salvadoran Draft Evader for Refugee Status-Refusal to Associate with Military Force That Engages in Internationally Condemned Acts of Violence, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 385 (1989).
117. M.A. 11, 899 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1990). Interestingly, the six judges comprising
the majority were Republican appointees (Judges Chapman, Hall, Russell, Widener, Wilkins, and Wilkinson), while the five-judge minority comprised Democratic appointees
(Judges Ervin, Murnaghan, Phillips, Sprouse, and Winter). See THE AMERICAN BENCH:
JUDGES OF THE NATION (Marie T. Hough et al. eds., 5th ed. 1989); Corii D. Berg, Note and
Comment, The Conscientious Objector Applying For Political Asylum: Forced To Bear
Arms And The Brunt of M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 14 Loy L.A. INT'L Comp. L.J. 139, 141 n.10
(1991).
118. Other Ninth Circuit decisions followed the Fourth Circuit. See Vilorio-Lopez v.
INS, 852 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1988) (evidence must demonstrate specific facts to prove either
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founded fear" standard has since evolved into requirements that
the alien have a genuine fear of political persecution"' which is
reasonably possible, 12 0 demonstrated "by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record."1 2
IV. INS

V. ELIAS-ZACARIAS: CLARIFICATION OF THE "WELLFOUNDED FEAR" OF PERSECUTION STANDARD?

A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In January, 1987, two armed, uniformed guerrillas came to the
home of.18-year-old Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias and his parents,
to recruit them for anti-government activities.12 2 The family refused to join.1 22' The guerrillas promised to return.'2 4 At the end of

Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias fled his native country,
March, 1987,
125
Guatemala.
In July, 1987, the INS apprehended Elias-Zacarias for illegally
entering the United States.12 ' During his deportation proceedings,

withholding of deportation and political asylum. 1 27 The immigration judge concluded that Elias-Zacarias was ineligible for both political asylum and withholding of deportation because he failed to
demonstrate actual persecution or a "well-founded fear of persecureligion, nationality, or membership in a
tion" on account of race,
1 8 e
particular social group.

The BIA summarily dismissed his appeal on procedural
past persecution or good reason to fear future persecution); Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d
1443 (9th Cir. 1990) (a showing of genuine fear satisfies the subjective component of the
"well-founded fear" standard, while the objective component is satisfied by credible, specific
evidence to show that the fear is reasonable and there is a reasonable possibility of persecution); Del Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787 (9th Cit. 1990) ("well-founded fear" means that a
reasonable person in the asylum applicant's circumstances would fear persecution if returned to his native country).
119. Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1988).
120. Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990).
121. Jalali v. INS, 921 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782
F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1985)).
122. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cit. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812, 814
(1992).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 814 (1992).
128. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)42, 1158(a) (1988).
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grounds, notwithstanding Elias-Zacarias' motion to reopen his deportation hearing to submit new evidence,' 9 showing that following his departure, the guerrillas twice returned to his family to recruit him.'3 0
1. The Immigration Judge and the BIA Decisions
The BIA denied reopening on the ground that this new evidence did not (i) show that the outcome of his deportation hearing
would change or (ii) establish a prima facie showing of asylum eligibility.' 3 1 The BIA rejected Elias-Zacarias' assertion that the continuing efforts to intimidate and recruit him and his family created
a "well-founded fear of persecution" if he remained in
3
Guatemala."'
2.

The Ninth Circuit Opinion

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on
appeal, holding that acts of conscription, even by a nongovernmental group, were sufficient to establish persecution, or its fear, on
account of political opinion.' 3 3 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the
applicant's refusal to become involved with any political faction
was a political opinion.'. 4 The court held that the guerrillas' motivation for kidnapping was political persecution, refusal to become
involved with any political faction was, itself, affirmative expression of a political opinion, and Elias-Zacarias possessed a "wellfounded fear" of persecution because of that opinion.13a
The INS petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.'6 The Court granted certiorari to clarify the meaning of
''persecution on account of . . . political opinion" in section
129. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992).
133. Id.
134. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 921 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1990).
135. Attempts by a guerrilla organization to conscript a person into its forces represented "persecution on account of... political opinion." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at
815. "The person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the
persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political."
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 850.
136. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815.
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101(a)(42). 111
B.
1.

The Decision

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that
a "generalized 'political' motive underlying the guerrillas' forced
recruitment" of Elias-Zacarias was insufficient, within the meaning
of section 101(a)(42), to warrant a fear of persecution for political
opinion. 3 8
In a brief majority opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the Court of
Appeals finding that the guerrillas' kidnappings were politically
motivated. He explained that the refusal to fight with the guerrillas was not political expression, and that the fear of persecution
because of that refusal was not a fear of political persecution. 139
Next, Justice Scalia relied on the "ordinary meaning" of sec-

tion 101(a)(42) to conclude thqt Eliqs-ZacariAs' forced recrilitment.
to carry on a war against the Guatemalan government was not
"persecution on account of political opinion.""'
While EliasZacarias argued that the guerrillas' political opinion was the source
of his persecution, Justice Scalia explained that it was the victim's
political opinion, not the persecutor's, which was dispositive."' Finally, Elias-Zacarias must still show that he possessed a "wellfounded fear" of persecution by the guerrillas precisely "because of
rather than because of his mere refusal to
[his] political opinion,
142
fight with them."
2.

The Dissent

Justice Stevens agreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that Elias-Zacarias had a "well-founded fear" of persecution because of a political opinion, whether it was expressed negatively or
137. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992).
138. Id. at 816.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. "If a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of political opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not engaging in persecution on account of religion."
Id.
142. INS V. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992) (emphasis added).
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affirmatively. 14" Moreover, even refusal to support a cause "motivated by nothing more than a simple desire to continue living an
ordinary life with one's family"1" was precisely that kind of political expression which145"the asylum provisions of the statute were intended to protect.

Justice Stevens pointed to the inconsistency between the majority's methodology in arriving at its narrow construction of "political opinion" and that taken by the majority in INS v. CardozaFonseca. " He argued that the construction of "political opinion"
articulated by Justice Scalia effectively created an evidentiary burden for asylum cases, indistinguishable from that of withholding of
deportation. 14 7 He reminded the Court that the underlying reason-

ing of the Cardoza-Fonseca decision would have easily resolved
"any doubts concerning the political character" of Elias-Zacarias'
refusal to join the guerrillas. "8
Justice Stevens concluded the record amply supported .a finding that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was expressive conduct that constituted a political opinion within the meaning of section 208(a).1 9
143. Id. at 817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 818.
145. Id.
Choosing to remain neutral is no less a political decision than is choosing to
affiliate with a particular political faction. Just as a nation's decision to remain
neutral is a political one, see, e.g., Neutrality Act of 1939, 22 U.S.C. §§ 441-65
(1982), so is an individual's. When a person is aware of contending political
forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any faction, that choice is a political
one.
Id. (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984)) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
146. Id.
147. INS V. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1992). In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Stevens explained, the Court endorsed a much lower evidentiary burden for asylum
applications. "[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend to restrict eligibility for [the asylum]
relief to those who could prove that it is more likely than not that they will be persecuted if
deported." Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987)).
148. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 818. Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act
with a clear intent to conform with the Protocol and to afford the United States greater
flexibility in mitigating the political and religious refugee crisis. Id. (citing INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. at 449-50).
149. Id. at 819. Justice Stevens also pointed to the applicant's explanation for his refusal to join the guerrillas that "[i]f you join the guerrillas . . . then you are against the
government. You are against the government and if you join them then it is to die
there. . . . And then the government is against you and your family."
Id. at 819 n.5 (quoting App. to Brief in Opposition 5a).
"The statute speaks simply in terms of a political opinion and does not require that the
view be well developed or elegantly expressed." Id. at 819 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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He rejected the Government's comparison of Elias-Zacarias' statements with those of a draft evader. 5 0 The statute only required
that the applicant demonstrate "that there [was] a 'real possibility'
that he [would] be persecuted on account of his political opinion. 1' 5 It did not require the applicant's 1political
opinion be exact,
5 2
"well developed, or elegantly expressed.
V.

POLITICAL OPINION AND THE "WELL-FOUNDED FEAR"
STANDARD

The majority opinion in Elias-Zacariasis curious because it
relies upon unusual methodology and interpretation of precedent
not predominantly used by the Supreme Court.
A. The Majority's "PlainMeaning" Methodology for Statutory Construction Is Inconsonant with Earlier "Plain Meaning"
Methods
"Plain meaning" is an approach to statutory construction
which relies on the "probable meaning of the 'plain' text, construed according to standard dictionaries, rules of grammar and
syntax, and the overall statutory structure."'5 8 Justice Scalia's
methods of implementing the plain meaning rule of statutory construction in Elias-Zacariasare inconsistent with those previously
employed by the Court.154 They differ most conspicuously from the
150. Id. The dissenting opinion explained the long-standing INS rejection of those applicants who evade selective service laws, irrespective of their political motivation. "[Ilt is
not persecution for a country to require military service of its citizens." Id. at 819 n.6 (quoting Matter of A-G, 19 1 & N Dec. 502, 506 (BIA 1987)). It rebutted the oversimplification of
the Government's argument:
It does not matter to the persecutors what the individual's motivation is. The
guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the reasoning process of those who
insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their cause. They are concerned
only with an act that constitutes an overt manifestation of a political opinion.
Persecution because of that overt manifestation is persecution because of a political opinion.
Id. (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984)).
151. Id. at 820 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (quoting INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984)).
152. Id. at 820.
153. William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 342 n.38 (1991).
154. The plain meaning rule has been a "'soft' rule-the plainest meaning can be
trumped by contradictory legislative history." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 621, 626 (1990). See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S.
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Cardoza-Fonsecadecision.1 55
First, in construing section 101(a)(42), Justice Scalia relies
upon Richards v. United States" for the proposition that "[iln
construing statutes, 'we must, of course, start with the assumption
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning
of the words used.' "' 7 Yet Richards was decided, more accurately,
upon the notion that where Congress has made no formal expression regarding the terms within the statute requiring interpretation, "a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from
the context of the whole Act, 58 and that in fulfilling [the Court's]
responsibility in interpreting legislation, '[the Court] must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should]
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy.'
Had the majority employed this Richards v. United States
plain meaning methodology, the Court would have necessarily relied, as in Cardoza-Fonseca,upon the statute as a whole and upon
its object and policy. Equally, the Court would have referred to the
U.N. Handbook. The majority makes no such reference to the statute as a whole, nor does it make any reference to any international
document to determine whether its interpretation even approximates the object and policy of the law. Given that the very title of
the 1980 Refugee Act evinces its purpose of regulating the international refugee, it is extraordinary that an opinion which purports
to rely on the methods of legislative interpretation first articulated
in Richards v. United States is so conspicuously bare of any reference to international documents.
Richards v. United States, therefore, is curious precedent for
the Elias-Zacarias majority's actual method of interpretation. It
63, 75 (1982) (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977)); INS v.
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
155. While the Cardoza-Fonseca Court's analysis began with the statutory language, the
Court expanded its search for the "plain meaning" of section 208 to legislative history and
international documents with emphasis upon legislative intent. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 431-32 & n.12, 436, 441-43 (1987).
156. 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
157. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816 (quoting Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. at 9).
158. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. at 11 (citing NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S.
282, 288 (1957) (alternative holding).
159. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. at 11 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122

(1849))).
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unquestionably signals a shift to a new plain meaning approach to
interpreting political opinion.
Second, the majority's methodology is, without even relying on
the tenets of Richards v. United States, exceedingly formalistic
and promotes inconsistency. Justice Scalia indiscriminately ignores
congressional intent, standard dictionaries, or overall statutory
structure in arriving at his "ordinary" meaning of political opinion,
as is normally required for plain meaning interpretation."' 0 Yet,
because the assessment of which particular meaning is "plain" necessarily embodies judicial discretion, the Court typically reviews
the statute's legislative history or the language of the entire statute

to insure that its plain reading does not lead to absurdity, extraordinary ambiguity in its application, or conflict with the statute's purpose."'
The majority's formalism renders Justice Scalia's plain meaning methodology arbitrary and internally inconsistent. He argues
that "political opinion" has an ordinary meaning and then defines
;t
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viewing asylum
cases have interpreted "political opinion" in dispa1

rate ways."' Justice Scalia does not address these dissimilar read-

160. The majority opinion stated that "[tihe ordinary meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account of. . .political opinion' in Sec. 101(a)(42) is persecution on account of the
victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 812.
161. "[W]e 'start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used."' Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 47 (1989) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). But the
Court also refers to "the 'object and policy' of the statute." Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 47 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. at 285
(quoting United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122, (1849))). See Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)) ("[Iln the process of drafting a
comprehensive scheme of reform Congress failed to address specifically how the mechanics
of the [CSRA] would function in certain situations, and the judicial task therefore is 'to look
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' "); Lindahl v. Office of
Personnel Management, 479 U.S. 768, 793-94 (1985) (citing Meyer v. Department of HHS,
666 F.2d 540, 542 (1981) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. at 11 (1962))); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1976).
162. See Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that punishment based on objection to participation in inhumane acts as part of forced military service
is "persecution" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); Campos-Guardado v.
INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (alien must show that she was persecuted because of any
political opinion which her persecutors believed she had); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (in determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear because
of a political opinion, one must look at the victim from the persecutor's perspective; if the
persecutor thinks the person is guilty of a political opinion, then the person is at risk);
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (persecution must have occurred because of
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ings. Moreover, he provides no explanation for how he selected his
particular "ordinary" meaning of "political opinion."
In short, Justice Scalia takes a demonstrably ambiguous term,
"political opinion," announces that it has a plain meaning, and
then assigns one without explaining the basis for his particular assignment. That the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of federal actions16e does not dispense with its concomitant responsibility to provide principled, reasoned decisions.""' Plain meaning
methodology requires the Court to inquire into Congress' intent
and explain that interpretation whenever a demonstrably ambiguous concept is ascribed its plain meaning. 166 Therefore, this majority's plain meaning approach frustrates the very method which
seeks to simplify statutory interpretation by determining the most
common meaning of the words creating the subject statute.
Third, the new plain meaning methodology applied to define
political opinion resembles arbitrary line-drawing. Even under Justice Scalia's plain meaning doctrine, where the words are demonstrably not self-explanatory the search for meaning expands beyond those words. 66 There is nothing in the text of section
101(a)(42) itself which supports the majority's determination over
7
16

any other.

The majority's disregard for legislative history is an effort to
give greatest effect only to concrete evidence of legislative intent 6 "
and avoid judicial law-making. ' However, efforts to avoid judicial
the victim's political beliefs); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985) (under
political asylum cases, it is permissible to examine the persecutor's motivation; and the
court looks to the political views of both the persecutor and the victim); Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984) (remaining neutral is no less a political opinion
than choosing to affirmatively act upon a political opinion).
163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
164. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 28-31 (1949); K. N. LLEWELLYN, THs BRAMBLE BUSH 34-35, 42 (1981).
165. Eskridge, supra note 153; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
166. Eskridge, supra note 153. Some scholars commend Justice Scalia's refusal to consider legislative background materials, as not having the force of law, in an attempt to preserve the separation of legislative and judicial functions. Eskridge, supra note 154, at 671
(citing A. Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History, delivered between fall 1985 and
spring 1986 at various law schools (copy on file with U.C.L.A. Law Review office)).
167. The 1980 Refugee Act provides that an alien who demonstrates that he has either
been persecuted or possesses "'a well-founded fear of persecution' in his home country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion" is a refugee and eligible for asylum consideration. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(1988).
The language is clearly open-ended.
168. Eskridge, supra note 154, at 668-69.
169. Id. at 655; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987) ("Judges interpret
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law-making can create arbitrary results. Arbitrariness, irrespective
of how unintended, can embrace judicial law-making. These efforts
to refrain from judicial law-making emphasize text at the full expense of context-the 1980 Refugee Act's object of mitigating an
international refugee crisis created by governments which afford
little protection for human rights.
Fourth, the majority's decision is void of reference to the very
document with which this Court stated the 1980 Refugee Act must
conform: the Protocol.17 0 Assessing the plain meaning of political
opinion within the Act should logically guide the Court to those
international documents which it judges as useful devices in making political asylum interpretations. 171 It is extraordinary that the
Court makes no reference to either the Protocol or the overall
structure of the Act.
The change in methodology between the two decisions seems
rooted in a shift in authorship. Justice Scalia has adopted the standard which he earlier proposed in his concurring opinion for Cardoza-Fonseca. This posits a more stringent approach to discerning
17
the plain meaning of section 101(a)(42) of the 1980 Refugee Act. 1
Undeniably, the majority's method of interpreting political
opinion avoids the problems created by reference to legislative history which, within the context of current problems the statute
must address, may be either obsolete or wholly misleading. 1 7 Nevertheless, all methods of statutory interpretation embrace judicial
1 74
discretion; they vary only in degree.
laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions.") (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
171. Like draft resistance, resistance to coercion by an insurgent group could qualify
under the "inhumane conduct" exception to the general rule in the U.N. Handbook that
draft resistance is not a form of persecution. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 1 164-74.
172. Justice Scalia harshly criticized the majority's methodology in his concurring opinion. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445 n.29 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
173. Eskridge, supra note 154, at 688-89.
174. Id.
It is mildly counterintuitive that an approach asking a court to consider materials generated by the legislative process, in addition to statutory text (also generated by the legislative process), canons of construction (generated by the judicial
process), and statutory precedents (also generated by the judicial process),
leaves the court with more discretion than an approach that just considers the
latter three sources.
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The majority's methods are not neutral. Its methods necessarily import policy choices.1 70 In the arena of political asylum, those

methods have international ramifications which the majority disregards. Because Article III of the Constitution defines the federal
courts as forums for resolving real cases and controversies,' 7" any
methodology which ignores the context in which those controversies arise is an expedient, but ineffective, Article III forum. Last,
interpretive rules which "ignore[ ] legislative intent . . . impose

undue burdens on the legislative process, hindering the ability of
the democratic branches to function effectively."'"' In light of the
desperate conditions under which political refugees are applying
for asylum, such formalism separate from context is disastrous.
B. The Majority's Construction of Political Opinion Is in
Conflict with its "PlainMeaning"
The majority's decision erroneously distinguishes affirmatively
from negatively expressed political beliefs. First, Justice Scalia argues that the victim's act of refusal alone is not political expression. 17 Yet, as Justice Stevens states, this construction of political
opinion disagrees with fundamental notions of political expression
protected by the First Amendment. '7" In short, the Court fails to
apply the same reasoning to evaluate Elias-Zacarias' political opinions which it has historically used to evaluate political opinion
cases.
The First Amendment protects acts of refusal not because
they constitute crystalline political beliefs. Rather, acts of refusal
are protected under the First Amendment because they are inte175. Eskridge, supra note 154, at 688-91.

Interpretation is a social process of construction, not a scientific process of discovery. Method can channel the argumentation and suggest information to be
considered, but it cannot dictate all that goes on in statutory, or any, interpretation. Discourse about the new textualism ought to consider this timeless theme
of the relationship of truth and method, for it goes to the heart of the formalist/
anti-formalist debate in statutory interpretation.

Id. at 691.
176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
177. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo.
LJ. 281, 291 (1989).

178. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
179. Id. at 818-19 n.5. See, e.g., Neutrality Act of 1939, 22 U.S.C. §§ 441-65 (1988)

[hereinafter Neutrality Act] (recognizing a nation's decision to remain neutral as a political
decision); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state's interest in promoting an appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride is not "ideologically neutral").
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gral to the individual's freedom of political self-expression.8 0 The
Supreme Court does not predicate protection for individual acts of
refusing to salute an American flag or to display a state motto on
one's license plate upon the presence or absence of fully-formed
political opinions.' 8' Political neutrality is a deeply embedded
principle of our legal system. It merits protection not because it
constitutes affirmative expression of political beliefs, but because it
represents self-expression falling within political contours. 8 2 As
Justice Douglas noted, "[t]he First Amendment in its respect for
the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and
belief." 1s8 Thus, the majority's reading of political opinion squarely
contradicts political opinion jurisprudence.
Second, the majority creates an artificial dichotomy within the
political opinion concept to distinguish the beliefs of the persecutor from the victim's.1 84 Within Justice Scalia's view, victims who
affirmatively express their political opinions satisfy the "wellfounded fear" standard; victims having no crystalline political belief, irrespective of the persecutor's political motivation, do not.
Politicians meet thes ,equiernets. U
.iverwLy
professors, celebrities, and other empowered, well-educated groups probably also fit
180. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnetta, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), for example,
the Court reasoned that the First Amendment protected public schoolchildren from a
State's attempt to coerce them to salute and pledge allegiance to the United States flag. The
key to Barnette is that the Court did not engage in the superfluous inquiry into the personal
politics of the schoolchildren who asserted their right to protection from compelled participation in saluting; rather, the Court correctly focused upon the acts of the officials who
attempted to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 628.
181. Id. at 628; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
182. See, e.g., Neutrality Act, supra note 179; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628 (the Bill of Rights protects an individual from state compulsion to
salute and pledge allegiance to the United States flag because there is no evidence that
remaining passive during a salute ritual creates a "clear and present danger"); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (the First Amendment protects individuals from compulsion to
associate with a political party); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705 (the state cannot criminally punish individuals who cover a state motto, "Live Free or Die," which they find repugnant to their moral, political, and religious beliefs); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209 (1977) (the state cannot compel an individual to contribute to support an ideological cause which he may not condone because the First Amendment also protects the rights
of dissenters).
183. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
184. The majority relies upon illustrations of persecution in which the distinctions between the beliefs of the persecutor and victim were obvious. "If a Nazi regime persecutes
Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account
of political opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not
engaging in persecution on account of religion." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816
(1992).
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within the majority's concept. Children 8 5 and illiterate indigenous
populations,' on the other hand, currently used as pawns in the
political struggle between factions, probably fail Justice Scalia's
test. They lack the elite's opportunities to become "political." In
short, Justice Scalia construes political opinion so narrowly that it
filters out all victims of persecution by coercive governments except the well-educated, politically active. Only this class of individuals has enough power to withstand their own government's pressures as they affirmatively express themselves, ensuring their safe
harbor within the latest United States creation of "political
opinion."
C. Judiciary Usurping Congressional Authority
The Elias-Zacariasdecision superimposes a constraint on political opinion which previously existed in neither Supreme Court
First Amendment nor immigration case law.'8 7 Moreover, Justice
Scalia's asylum guidance is highly artificial because (i) it clearly
contradicts both the letter and spirit of the Cardoza-Fonsecadecision,' (ii) does nothing to clarify the demonstrably "less-thanplain meaning" of the "well-founded fear" standard,"8 " and (iii)
185. Jonathan Power, The Littlest Victims of Abuse, of Torture - and of Murder,
Oct. 28, 1992, at A17 (massacre of 100 children in Central African Republic
by Emperor Bokassa in 1979 and documented evidence of torture of children of political
opponents in Saddam Hussein's Iraq in an effort to keep the parents silent); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ: MIDDLE EAST WATCH 47-49 (1990).
186. Sam Dillon, Rights Advocates in Peru Criticize Report From U.S., MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 22, 1991, at A10 (375 documented appearances in the year since President Alberto
Fujimori took office); Patrick McDonnell, The ABCs of Freedom, L.A. TIMEs (San Diego),
Oct. 20, 1991, at B1 (during the last eleven years, more than 1 million Guatemalans, many of
whom are illiterate, have been driven to foreign exile). See AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: No NEUTRAL ALLOWED (1988). By 1982, United Nations estimated at least 25,000 refugees in border camps in southern Mexico; Catholic Church of
Guatemala estimated that one million of a total of seven million Guatemalans had been
displaced by the conflict; other church sources claimed that there were more than 500,000
displaced persons within Guatemala City alone. Id.
187. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705.
188. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436 (citing S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d
Seas. 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. and H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1979)); Joys, supra note 33, at 238; Monroe Leigh, Note, Immigration Law-Asylum- WellFounded Fear of Persecution:Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 654 (1987).
189. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. Elias-Zacarias merely states what
political opinion is not.
MIAMI HERALD,
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usurps congressional authority."' 0
That political asylum standards expand or contract is not the
greatest objection to this particular constriction. Immigration and
asylum standards in this nation have historically followed politics. l 9 ' Rather, it is the institution and its methodology which is
most objectionable. If asylum standards are to be narrowed, they
should be done so expressly and by the legislative branch, entrusted with the power to set those standards. 9 2 For the Court to
assume that role is to undermine its very legitimacy. 98
Only the legislative branch provides the requisite forum where
all of the issues surrounding asylum modification are subject to the
political process. This political process. is essential because the
credibility of our immigration position, domestically and internationally, hinges upon the extent to which there is representation of
all Americans' interests."9
D.

The Impact of Elias-Zacarias on Asylum Determinations

While the majority intended its political opinion distinction to
delineate political asylum's scope to provide uniformity in application, it is arbitrary, divisive, and necessarily leads to inequitable
results. It does so because it is built on two fundamentally erroneous assumptions that (i) persecution is sufficiently rational that the
persecutor's and victim's beliefs are actually distinguishable and
(ii) that political persecution is always directed at the victim's beliefs. These are questionable assumptions which promote uncer190. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (The Court has long recog-

nized the "power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised
by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.").

191. Elizabeth Midgley, Comings and Goings in U.S. Immigration Policy, in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980s 41, 41-69 (Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Mark J. Miller eds., 1983); MICHAEL C. LEMAY, FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR 119 (1987).

192. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) ("[Tlhe power over
aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1954) (While "much could be said for the view" that due
process limits congressional power over immigrants to some degree, "the formulation of
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress" and this is "firmly embedded in the
legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic .....
193. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. at 529.
194. See Mark J. Miller & Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Immigration Reform: The
United States and Western Europe Compared, in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980s, 271, 292-95 (Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Mark J. Miller eds.,
1983).
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tainty in an area of immigration law which sorely needs to promote
consistency and fairness.
These assumptions are questionable because persecutors seek
not to eliminate their victims' political beliefs but to eliminate
their own perception of those beliefs. Contrary to Justice Scalia's
assertion, millions of Jews suffered not because of their beliefs, but
because of their persecutors' erroneous beliefs about who they
were, what they thought, and what they practiced. 1" The questionable assumptions on which the Elias-Zacariasdecision hinges aggravate already uncertain circumstances, within already uncertain
standards, because of the familiar theme on which political asylum
is premised-the mitigation of an international immigration crisis
resulting from governments' arbitrary denial of basic human rights.
This theme is best illustrated and most compelling in the case of
Guatemalan political refugees.
Guatemala is a useful case study because it illustrates
complex interrelationship between the three undercurrents of
litical opinion: government, subversive politics, and political
pression. Guatemala illustrates why the majority's distinctions
tween the political beliefs of the persecutor and the victim
inherently artificial dichotomies.

the
poopbeare

Guatemala typifies political turmoil. Amnesty International
estimates that, from the early to mid-1980s alone, some 50,000
Guatemalans were killed.196 Since 1980, roughly one out of eight
Guatemalan citizens has fled their home into exile.19 The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights reported in 1991 that
during the first quarter of that year, there were 585 complaints of
"extrajudicial executions" and 113 desaparecidos.98 More than
195. LENI YAHIL, THE HOLOCAUST: THE FATE OF EUROPEAN JEWRY 1932-1945, 34-52
(1990). "Hatred of the Jews is not a function of their behavior or deeds; it is an entirely

irrational phenomenon and, thus, not given to explication or rectification by means of reason." Id. at 34.
196. James North, Fiction Illuminates Brutal Facts On Central America, CH. Tam.,

Jan. 20, 1992, at C3. The Organization of American States (OAS) reported that there were
700 unresolved cases of disappearances in the first six months of 1988 and 621 confirmed

political assassinations between January and September of that year. Debbie Sontag, FlareUp of Violence Troubles Guatemalans, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 30, 1989, at A17.
197. McDonnell, supra note 186. See AMERICAS WATCH CoMMITTEE, supra note 186; see
also, AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE, GUATEMALA: A NATION OF PRISONERS 1-5 (1984).
198. OAS INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 206

(1992) (Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala reported 575 extrajudicial executions, 236
murders, and 144 forced disappearances).
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half seek asylum from Mexico and the United States.'" The Americas Watch and the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs categorize Guatemala as this hemisphere's worst human
rights violator.2 00
Yet Guatemalans, and refugees from other countries whose
governments are considered "emerging democracies,"201 have a less
than five percent rate of approval under political asylum. 0 2 Applicants from countries with whom the United States is at odds, by
contrast, have a greater than thirty percent approval rate."' The
Elias-Zacarias"political opinion" dichotomy raises an already difficult hurdle. The majority's opinion is unfortunate but accurate
testimony to the quintessential American perspective. While failing to expressly apply American political opinion reasoning to the
Elias-Zacariascase, the majority, nevertheless, unwittingly predicates their persecutor-victim political opinion dichotomy on American assumptions about one of our most unique and jealously protected rights-our freedom to express. Because the majority of
Guatemalans, unlike Americans, are indigenous, illiterate, and po2 4
litically powerless, they must survive by being imperceptible.
Their political anonymity is their linchpin to subsistence. Most
likely to be politically persecuted, the disenfranchised are the least
willing to express any opinion, and, today, the least likely to meet
this Court's narrow political opinion asylum standard.
199. McDonnell, supra note 186.
200.

AMERICAS WATCH CoMMIrEE,

supra note 186; Sontag, supra note 196.

201. The U.S. State Department correctly describes Guatemala as an "emerging democracy." Sontag, supra note 196.
202. R.A. Zaldivar, House of God Collide with Law in Aiding Aliens Fugitives Find
Safety, But Price May Be High, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 21, 1985, at Al.
203. See id. (citing acceptance rates of 2.5 percent for Salvadorans, 12 percent for Nicaraguans, 33 percent for Poles, 41 percent for Afghans, and 25 percent for all nationalities);
see also U.S. Dep't Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Asylum Cases Filed
with District Director by Selected CountriesFiscal Year 1984, 33 INS REPORTER 10 (1985)
(statistics on grants of asylum for fiscal year 1984).
204. McDonnell, supra note 186; AMEICAS WATCH COMMIT=, supra note 186, at 7.
The principal casualties of the conflict in Guatemala and the government's counterinsurgency campaign "have been the lives, cultures, and traditions of Guatemala's Indians.
One of the 23 linguistic groups, the Ixil of El Quiche, has been all but wiped out as a cultural entity." Id.; Marco Antonio Sagastume, On Human Rights in Guatemala, in GUATEMALA: TYRANNY ON TRIAL 73 (Susanne Jonas et al. eds. & trans., 1984); see also, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 1-3, 53-61, 128-41 (1987).
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CONCLUSION

The Elias-Zacarias decision marks a withdrawal from Cardoza-Fonseca's political asylum standard. As Justice Stevens argues, the rigid plain meaning methodology used to derive a narrow
construction of political opinion effectively recreates an evidentiary
standard for asylum indistinguishable from that of withholding of
deportation. Thus, Elias-Zacarias limits the impact of CardozaFonseca and frustrates the purpose of the 1980 Refugee Act.
As a nation, we are the progeny of immigrants and necessarily
the beneficiaries of immigration. 00 Yet we are obliged to balance
these interests against our interests in protecting the rights of our
current citizens. Thus, efforts of a uniquely immigrant society to
engage in "gatekeeping" create a most fundamental paradox.
United States "asylum" raises complex, emotionally-charged
issues. 06 Yet, a democracy purportedly rooted in equality, law, and
order must apply ideologically-neutral asylum policies or risk great
social costs.10 7 That political asylum standards must be equitable
and uniform does not spontaneously make them so.Y' 5 As a society,

we must begin to ask the difficult, less-than-politically correct
questions. As members of an international community, we must do
so with a conscious distinction between immigration and political
205. When the Swedish Academy of Sciences announced its Nobel Prize winners in
1984, of the four American winners, three were immigrants: Henry Taub, Chemist; S. Chandras Ekhar, Physicist; and Gerard Debreu, Economist. See Laurence H. Fuchs, The Search
for a Sound Immigration Policy: A Personal View, in CLAMOR AT THE GATEs 18, 319 n.1
(Nathan Glazer ed., 1985). "This kept with the pattern that more than 30 percent of all
living American Nobel Prize winners [are] immigrants, as are 25 percent of the members of
the American National Academy of Science." Id. at 18.
206. Id. at 18.
207. See Miner & Papademetriou, supra note 194:

At the bottom of the debate on numbers, limits, and the "desirable" ethnic composition of migrant flows to any advanced industrial democracy is a basic concern with the future ethnic, cultural, and linguistic profile of the society in ques-

tion. Although American concern over this is often couched in perfectly neutral
terms, the fear is of an unduly Hispanic United States fifty or one hundred years
from now.

Id. at 292.
To echo the 150-year old predictions of Alexis de Tocqueville and to paraphrase
Gunnar Myrdal . . ., the greatest threat to national unity-the continuing
"American Dilemma"-is the pervasive and historical racism of American society. The myth of cultural pluralism usually works well only when race does not

intrude as a variable.
Id. at 295.

208. See generally Fuchs, supra note 205, at 20.
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asylum. Until then; political asylum remains an enduring issue in
search of culturally durable standards. Its resolution rests in the
legislative branch and the will of the American people, not judicial
textualism and syntax.
D.F.
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